Inequitable distribution of water is the major obstacle for most of the locally managed irrigation system in Nepal. This inequity is primarily brought by an asymmetrical power situation in the society. This book presents an economically optimal water distribution model considering the political dimension for a locally managed and glacier based irrigation system located in trans-Himalayan region of Nepal. Plugging the power coefficient into economic modelling is the main distinctive feature of this study over the other conventional optimization models. The primary data were collected from three VDCs of Upper Mustang namely Chhuksang, LoManthang and Chhoser where the farmers are practicing locally based and centuries-old irrigation systems and a distinct social hierarchy has assigned defined roles and responsibilities for each hierarchical level with regards to irrigation management. To address the challenges, firstly, the local political power relation is analysed and power coefficient is derived. Their problem is modelled into principal-agent bargaining relationship based upon who have water rights and who have labour endowment. Their combined benefit is maximized incorporating the respective power coefficient subject to given constraints. The empirical finding shows that each interest group can be benefitted when they participate in principalagent bargaining framework. It can be concluded that a significant improvement in the society can be achieved only by slightly modifying the tactic of exchanging resources between the conflicting interest groups.
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Farming & Rural systems Economics Vol. 128ISSN 1616-98082011; XIV +212pp.; 21 x 14,8 cm; paper
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